Two Young Men Got Access to America’s Nuclear Secrets. They Work for Elon Musk

In February, a strange story broke around the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)—an entity created to “modernize the state” and led by Tesla CEO Elon Musk. Musk had abruptly fired 350 federal workers, only to rehire many after realizing they were critical to nuclear weapons assembly. Now, the situation has escalated into something far more serious.

Access they shouldn’t have had. According to NPR, two young DOGE employees gained access to classified nuclear networks that hold some of the U.S.’ most sensitive information. Luke Farritor, a 23-year-old former SpaceX intern, and Adam Ramada, an angel investor with no prior experience in defense or intelligence, were listed for at least two weeks in directories for both the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense classified systems.

These networks aren’t ordinary databases—they contain nuclear weapons designs, manufacturing materials, and strategic communications between labs, production facilities, and the Pentagon.

From denial to alarm. The Department of Energy (DOE) initially denied any breach, but later acknowledged the accounts had been created—though not activated or used. Even so, experts argue that the mere existence of these accounts signals serious systemic failures, especially given that access typically requires a “Q” clearance, the DOE’s highest level of authorization.

The NNSA’s Enterprise Secure Network and the Department of Defense’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) are among the most secure systems in the federal government. While being listed doesn't necessarily allow someone to view classified material, it can pave the way for future access or influence. As one analyst told NPR, it’s the kind of technical footprint that can be quietly expanded later.

More from Xataka On

Tesla Was a Shiny New Toy for Wall Street Until Musk’s Political Pursuits Almost Ruined It

Broader pattern emerges. This incident isn’t isolated. Earlier this year, DOGE-led purges at the NNSA—only partially reversed under public pressure—resulted in the dismissal of dozens of nuclear specialists. Around the same time, a whistleblower reported that DOGE members had accessed systems at the National Labor Relations Board, disabled surveillance tools, and deleted activity logs.

In one especially troubling case, login credentials created by DOGE were used from a Russian IP address, triggering cybersecurity alerts across several agencies. The breach adds to an already tense climate, including controversy over Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s alleged use of Signal to discuss military operations.

DOGE’s experiment. DOGE was pitched as an answer to government inefficiency, drawing on a blend of entrepreneurs, technologists, and outsiders. But critics say it’s rapidly becoming a shadow bureaucracy—unelected, opaque, and dangerously underregulated. Even allies of Musk’s vision are starting to question its unchecked expansion and disregard for institutional safeguards.

The inclusion of figures like Farritor and Ramada—who lacked experience in defense, yet were granted proximity to the nuclear chain of command—highlights the risk of technocratic overreach. As Hans Kristensen of the Nuclear Information Project put it, even unclassified nuclear budgets require specialized technical knowledge.

A parallel state. At its core, this scandal reflects a deeper shift: the growing influence of private operators in national security domains with minimal oversight or legal accountability. The logic of speed and innovation has overtaken the logic of structure and control.

The fallout is still unfolding, and with Musk reportedly planning to exit DOGE soon, the long-term consequences remain unclear. But the lesson is already stark: When efficiency becomes the enemy of accountability, national security is what’s at stake.

Image | Gage Skidmore

Related | Elon Musk Fired Self-Drive Car Safety Experts—the Same People Who Were Supposed to Regulate Tesla’s Vehicles